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It has often been reported that different demographic groups show persistent differences in their inﬂ  ation expectations. 
Some reasonable explanations have been suggested, but most have failed to fully explain these apparent differences. 
We argue that the demographic differences have been overstated by using the mean to describe differences across 
demographic groups. When we use the median to describe inﬂ  ation expectations, we ﬁ  nd little meaningful difference 
across demographic groups.
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Most macroeconomists have come to believe that inﬂ  ation 
expectations are a key determinant of actual inﬂ  ation. This 
clearly has important implications for policymakers. As 
Federal Reserve System Chairman Ben Bernanke observed 
in 2004, “. . . an essential prerequisite to controlling inﬂ  ation 
is controlling inﬂ  ation expectations.” Consequently, moni-
toring and measuring the public’s inﬂ  ation expectations is of 
enormous importance to the monetary authority.
There are several ways to measure these expectations. They 
can be inferred from ﬁ  nancial instruments or modeled more 
explicitly. But the most straightforward way to assess the 
public’s expectations on inﬂ  ation is to simply ask American 
households.
Unfortunately, survey measures of the public’s inﬂ  ation 
expectations tend to generate responses that appear at odds 
with actual experience. And systematic differences across de-
mographic groups that aren’t easily explained by economic 
factors have led some to wonder whether these surveys 
are actually providing meaningful information on inﬂ  ation 
expectations to policymakers.
However, we argue that these demographic differences have 
been overstated by previous research, and that by measuring 
average inﬂ  ation expectations in a particular way, we can see 
that these survey measures are indeed informative, whether 
for a given demographic group or across an entire survey.
Different Groups, Different Inﬂ  ation Expectations?
The University of Michigan conducts one of the longest-
running surveys of American households. Each month, 
a minimum of 500 interviews are conducted by phone, 
with samples designed to be representative of all American 
households, excluding those in Alaska and Hawaii. These 
monthly surveys contain approximately 50 core questions, 
each of which tracks a different aspect of consumer attitudes 
and expectations. Regarding expectations of inﬂ  ation, the 
following question has been asked of survey participants 
since the early 1980s:
“During the next 12 months, do you think that prices 
in general will go up, or go down, or stay where they 
are now?”
One of the odd aspects of the responses to this question is 
that different demographic groups seem to show persistent 
differences in their inﬂ  ation expectations, even after adjust-
ing for economically relevant factors.
It isn’t necessarily surprising that households have a range 
of inﬂ  ation expectations. After all, households can have 
different inﬂ  ation experiences, depending on the things 
they buy (their “market basket”). In fact, one recent study 
showed that these differences can be considerable—as much 
as 1 to 3 percentage points per year. However, the aver-
age differences in inﬂ  ation experiences across groups—less 
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Note: Expectations are weighted using household weights provided in the 
University of Michigan, Surveys of Consumers. 
Source: University of Michigan, Surveys of Consumers; authors’ calculations.
Figure 1. Mean Inﬂ  ation Expectations by Group
Note: Expectations are weighted using household weights provided in the 
University of Michigan, Surveys of Consumers.
Source: University of Michigan, Surveys of Consumers; authors’ calculations.
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than half a percentage point at most annually—turn out to 
be notably smaller than the differences in groups’ inﬂ  ation 
expectations. Market-basket differences, then, don’t seem 
adequate to explain the differences in inﬂ  ation expectations 
that we observe across groups.
An illustration of these differences can be seen with gen-
der. If we adjust for race and education by restricting our 
comparison to white, college-educated individuals, women’s 
inﬂ  ation expectations remain consistently higher than men’s 
throughout the last decade (ﬁ  gure 1). 
Previous studies show similar patterns. A study by Mike 
Bryan and Guhan Venkatu shows a persistent gap for an 
earlier period, after trying to control for differences in in-
come and marital status; and a study using inﬂ  ation percep-
tions data from Swedish households in 1977 documents a 
difference between men and women, also after adjusting the 
groups to make them more similar. The Swedish study’s au-
thor concludes that the observed difference might reﬂ  ect the 
fact that women tend to make most of the food purchases 
in a household. Since Swedish food prices were rising more 
rapidly than most prices at the time, this seemed plausible. 
However, subsequent surveys in the United States show the 
same pattern for men and women, over periods when food 
prices are actually rising less rapidly than most other prices. 
Moreover, men’s and women’s perceptions of price changes 
for the same items show differences too, suggesting that the 
explanation for the persistent gap in inﬂ  ation expectations 
we observe might run deeper than mere market-basket dif-
ferences.
Measuring the Average
So, what’s driving these differences? There are a number 
of possible explanations, but the one we ﬁ  nd most convinc-
ing is that we’re simply mismeasuring average expectations. 
When we compare various groups’ inﬂ  ation expectations 
and conclude that they are different, we’re generally com-
paring their means. But a better measure of the average 
is probably the median because of the way these survey 
responses tend to be distributed.
Figure 2 shows the median inﬂ  ation expectation for the 
same two groups as shown in ﬁ  gure 1. To ﬁ  nd this measure 
of the average, we arrange survey participants’ responses 
from lowest to highest and ﬁ  nd the response in the middle 
of the array; that response is the median. By construction, 
half of our responses are above the median, while half are 
below it.
One advantage of using the median rather than the mean is 
that it isn’t sensitive to the extreme responses that may skew 
a distribution. An example often used to illustrate this point 
relates to income. Just a few very high-income individuals 
can dramatically affect the mean. For instance, imagine an 
economy with 10 people, where 9 have incomes of $100 
and 1 has an income of $10,000. The median income in this 
hypothetical economy is $100, while the mean income is 
$1,090. If we want to use the average to summarize living 
standards for a typical person in this economy, the mean 
might lead us to believe that this person is more than 
10 times richer than is the case. The median, on the other 
hand, successfully describes incomes for most individuals 
in this economy. Accordingly, we typically think of median 
income as a more informative statistic than mean income.
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Figure 4. Standardized Deviations from 
Survey Median by Group
Expectations are weighted using household weights provided in the Univer-
sity of Michigan, Surveys of Consumers. 
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The same logic might also apply to inﬂ  ation expectations. 
Indeed, if we were to use the median to measure average 
expectations, we would come to a different conclusion 
than if we were to use the mean. The former suggests that 
there is in fact very little difference in inﬂ  ation expectations 
between white, college-educated men and women. The lat-
ter, however, as in the income example, is inﬂ  uenced by a 
small number of relatively high responses and, as a result, 
appears to show a difference between the two groups.
We can see this clearly by looking at a couple of points on 
the distribution of inﬂ  ation expectations responses. The 
ﬁ  rst such point is at the 90th percentile. If, when consider-
ing only college-educated white women, we were to select 
the response that was greater than 90 percent of the other 
responses for this group, we would ﬁ  nd that this value is 
frequently several percentage points higher than the com-
parable ﬁ  gure for college-educated white men. Put simply, 
the highest responses for women are higher than the high-
est responses for men.
However, the distribution of responses looks very similar 
for the two groups up to the 60th percentile. It’s only after 
this point that women begin to consistently report higher 
expectations than their male survey counterparts. The 
question—thinking back to the income example—is: Do we 
want to use the differences among the two groups’ more 
extreme observations to help us characterize their average 
tendencies?
An example from the medical ﬁ  eld might further clarify 
things. If a drug trial showed that, on average, women 
derived beneﬁ  t from some treatment while men derived no 
beneﬁ  t and suffered side effects as well, a doctor might de-
cide quite reasonably to prescribe this treatment only for his 
female patients. But what if the average beneﬁ  t shown for 
female study participants was actually associated with only 
a few women who saw dramatic improvements, while most 
women had the same outcomes as men? In this instance, it 
seems it would be irresponsible to prescribe the treatment 
to women as a matter of course. Some women may see 
signiﬁ  cant beneﬁ  ts from the treatment, but most would not 
and many may suffer side-effects as well. This suggests the 
problem with relying on the mean without a more complete 
understanding of the full distribution of outcomes.
Performing the same exercise as we did for gender for dif-
ferent demographic groups shows the same basic result: 
different means, but no difference in the medians. The fol-
lowing chart shows means and medians from January 2000 
to June 2010 for 24 nonoverlapping groups. The groups are 
formed from two categories for gender (male and female), 
race (white and non-white), and education (college and non-
college), and three categories for age (young: 18–39; middle 
age: 40–59; and old: over 60). For instance, M.W.C.Y is 
male, white, college-educated, and young.
It’s fairly obvious from ﬁ  gure 3 that, aside from one cat-
egory, there are no differences in the medians across these 
categories. However, these data were combined across sur-
veys spanning 10 years. Combining the data in this manner 
implicitly assumes that there are no important differences in 
the distribution of responses across surveys—that a relatively 
tranquil month in 2005 is the same as December 2008, 
when we were in the throes of a ﬁ  nancial crisis. That is not 
the case. For instance, in the summer of 2008, prior to the 
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onset of the most acute phase of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, median 
inﬂ  ation expectations stood at about 5 percent. But by the 
end of the year, this ﬁ  gure had fallen to about 2 percent.
In order to have conﬁ  dence in our results, we transform the 
data to remove survey-speciﬁ  c differences in the levels and 
variability of inﬂ  ation expectations. These transformations 
give us re-scaled responses and leave only the relative differ-
ences between respondents, which is what we’re interested 
in understanding. After we’ve removed these survey-speciﬁ  c 
factors, we can combine responses across multiple surveys.
The way we do this is to express every response relative to 
its survey average. This reconstructed value will indicate 
how many percentage points a response is above or below 
the typical (or average) response in the same month. In this 
case, for the reasons mentioned earlier, we’ll use the median 
as our measure of the typical or average response.
Similarly, because of changing economic conditions, the 
range of responses can vary from month to month. That 
is, some surveys might exhibit relatively more agreement 
among respondents than others. As 2008 wore on, for in-
stance, survey respondents started to show greater disagree-
ment (as measured by monthly survey variance) in their 
inﬂ  ation expectations.
We adjust for this also, and express our reconstructed 
responses as a proportion of the average amount of dis-
agreement (or variability) in a given month. In this case, we 
measure variability as the average absolute distance of all 
responses in a month from that month’s median response. 
Again, when we take the average absolute distance, we mea-
sure average as the median rather than the mean.
While we might have more conﬁ  dence in combining this 
transformed data from more than 100 individual surveys, 
the new data (in ﬁ  gure 4) don’t meaningfully alter the basic 
pattern shown previously by the untransformed data in 
ﬁ  gure 3. Despite differences in the means, outside of one 
category, there aren’t any differences in the medians. We 
can also clearly see what we observed when looking at the 
time-series plot for college-educated, white men and women. 
There is tremendous similarity across groups in the lower 
half of the distribution, but somewhere between the 50th 
and the 75th percentiles, differences begin to emerge. These 
differences become even more pronounced at the 90th 
percentile.
Should we use groups’ more extreme observations to help 
us characterize their average tendencies? We think the 
answer is no. Relying on means emphasizes the differences 
that exist across groups primarily among their most extreme 
high responses, and obscures the overlap that exists across 
much of the rest of their distributions.
To put it differently, it isn’t that men and women, in general, 
are providing very different forecasts of inﬂ  ation; it’s that 
some women—a relatively small subset—are. But it would be 
a mistake to ascribe these more extreme views to that group 
as a whole. Using the median avoids this problem. And 
when we use the median, it suggests, in general, that there 
aren’t meaningful differences in inﬂ  ation expectations across 
different demographic groups.
A Possible Cause of the Variation
Still, a question remains about what is causing the differenc-
es in inﬂ  ation expectations across groups toward the high 
end of their distributions. One possible explanation uncov-
ered by other researchers relates to ﬁ  nancial literacy.
Wändi Bruine de Bruin and fellow researchers from Carne-
gie Mellon University and the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York noted that several previous studies had shown lower 
ﬁ  nancial literacy in the demographic groups that tend to 
overestimate inﬂ  ation: women, singles, some minorities, and 
those without a college education. (Mary Burke, at the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Boston, noted a similar association.) 
In addition, they found that these groups were more likely 
to provide responses above a certain high threshold (in this 
case, 5 percent). They also found that adding ﬁ  nancial lit-
eracy as an explanatory variable reduced the importance of 
several demographic factors, speciﬁ  cally, gender, education, 
and income.
This evidence appears to be consistent with what we ob-
serve in the data from the University of Michigan: stability 
in inﬂ  ation expectations across groups, until we get toward 
the higher-value responses. While we have previously as-
cribed the demographic differences we see when examining 
means to the groups themselves, it appears that another at-
tribute—low ﬁ  nancial literacy—may actually have been driv-
ing the differences instead. Since these low ﬁ  nancial literacy 
respondents are often providing answers that are well above 
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ated with different demographic groups, it makes sense that 
the differences we observe in inﬂ  ation expectations across 
groups appear in the upper half of these distributions. The 
effect is to skew the mean, in a way that may not effectively 
describe expectations for a typical respondent in a given 
demographic group. As in the income example, using a 
median addresses this potential problem.
Finally, we know that using the median of the entire survey 
is a fairly accurate predictor of future inﬂ  ation—typically 
more accurate than the forecasts from simple models and 
about as accurate as the forecasts from professional forecast-
ers. However, a concern about using a median (or trimmed-
mean) was that it would disproportionately screen out some 
demographic groups (which had higher representation in 
the tails). But perhaps all that’s happening is that the inﬂ  u-
ence of less ﬁ  nancially literate individuals is being reduced, 
thereby improving forecast accuracy relative to the mean.
Aside from forecast accuracy, however, the argument for 
using the median is that it may simply be a better way to 
describe the average in these data. When we take medians 
within narrowly deﬁ  ned demographic groups, we see es-
sentially no differences in their inﬂ  ation expectations, and 
this—as in the case of the overall survey—may be a much 
more informative measure of inﬂ  ation expectations for these 
groups than their corresponding means.
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